Battle of ‘wills’

Modern military theorists believe that alongside material and intellectual advantages, a key factor for military success in all major conflicts is the collective national will to fight. This will is the product of the interaction among the 'Clausewitzian trinity' of the military, the state, and society, and it introduces an element of unpredictability into war outcomes. In most wars, one side eventually loses the will to continue fighting and accepts defeat (or disadvantageous peace terms) to avoid disaster. But how and why does the breakdown of national will occur, and what does the history of Russian wars tell us about the likelihood of this scenario in the Russia-Ukraine war? These questions are explored by Georgetown University professor Ben Connable, the author of an upcoming book on the mythology of modern warfare, set for release in early 2025.

While most analysts approach wars, including the current one, from the perspective of evaluating the resources of the opposing sides (an approach also taken by Vladimir Putin, who has bet on a 'war of attrition'), Connable suggests focusing on the factor of the 'will to fight', which is just as crucial and can lead to military defeat even for a country that initially had a clear resource advantage. This will, in particular, influences a nation's ability to mobilise resources and optimise their use.

Viewed from this perspective, the war in Ukraine is essentially unfolding as a contest of three wills: the will of Ukraine, the will of Russia, and the will of the West. Without Western support, the resource balance between Russia and Ukraine would become highly unequal. The war’s outcome surprisingly hinges not only on this resource balance but also on the interplay and mutual perceptions of each side’s willpower within this triangular dynamic.

The myth of Russia’s indomitable military tenacity ('Russians never surrender') remains widespread in the West, Connable notes. To some extent, this myth appears validated by the current war. Otherwise, it is difficult to comprehend how Russian command has continued for nearly three years with 'meat wave' assaults, at times losing up to a thousand soldiers killed and wounded daily (as estimated by Western intelligence during the current offensive). Yet Russian soldiers continue, wave after wave, to march toward near-certain death in a war whose goals and rationale few can clearly articulate. Equally perplexing is the indifference of Russian society, which seems largely unbothered by the enormous human losses and economic costs.

The Russian Myth: Traumatic Messianic Nationalism

Indeed, history provides examples of how, when faced with an existential threat, Russians have demonstrated remarkable resilience and a capacity for mobilisation, as seen in the two 'patriotic' wars. The memory of these events affects both Russians themselves and their adversaries. Many studies of Russian history and culture emphasise a complex of key factors that shape the country's approach to conflict, including trauma, nationalism, spirituality, and fatalism, notes Connable. These four elements are tightly interwoven and underpin society’s endurance in the face of the hardships and sacrifices associated with war. Together, they create what economist Yevgeny Yasin has referred to as ‘tragic passivity', which makes Russians vulnerable to Putin's calculated manipulations, in his book: Culture Matters in Russia—and Everywhere

Patrimonial state control remains the dominant social model outside of the 'Moscow bubble' and a few other major cities, Yasin believes. In other words, this model persists in the rural heartland, which is the primary source of recruits for the war in Ukraine. The trauma inflicted on Russian society through its dependency on the state is compounded by the trauma of 'lost greatness' following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This second trauma generated a demand for national revival, an image that Putin presents to the Russian public, which helps to offset the painful nature of citizens' relationship with the state (a point often discussed by sociologist Lev Gudkov). Using high revenues from resource extraction, Putin revitalised the Russian economy and, through 'cultural therapy', re-centralised Russian society around nationalism and messianic spirituality, offering Russians a renewed sense of collective purpose.

Modern Russian nationalism is built on a narrative of constant existential threat and a messianic understanding of the Russian people’s historical role. This set of beliefs can justify significant sacrifices. The author of A Sense of Mission in Russian Foreign Policy, Alicia Kuranovich, notes that unlike other nations, Russian messianism is based not on the idea of freedom but on the principle of justice. This means that Russian messianism is a counter-hegemonic narrative, portraying Russia as an outsider defending itself and other nations from the pressures exerted by more powerful forces. Both narratives – the existential threat and the special mission – are united in the national myth of the 'patriotic' wars, especially the myth of the Great Patriotic War. This myth, heavily exploited by Putin throughout his presidency, has become the central national narrative, shaping the nation’s self-image. One of its crucial implications is a reduced sensitivity to human losses, given the immense sacrifice of 25 million lives in that war.

Victories and defeats: between existential and colonial warfare

This layer of interconnected Russian narratives is well-known and seemingly still relevant to some extent in today’s Russia. However, Russian history and the history of its wars clearly show that this mythology does not necessarily activate with the start of every conflict. The claims that 'Russians never surrender' and 'never lose wars' are largely inconsistent with reality.

In general, out of approximately 40 significant military conflicts and wars that Russia has fought since the early 19th century (the exact number depends on the chosen threshold for the scale of the conflict and whether it is considered an independent war or part of a series of related military operations), Russia has been defeated in about 10, nearly one in four conflicts (see the table below, where wars with unfavourable outcomes for Russia are highlighted in red). This is quite a high number, especially considering that most of these conflicts were against smaller neighbouring states or involved suppressing uprisings in various parts of the empire and its dependent territories.

Each of Russia's defeats, of course, had its own specific causes, but in most cases, a common thread can be observed: the misjudgment of the enemy's potential and will to fight. This often led to tactical failures, declining public support for the war, and a weakening will to achieve victory, which in turn frequently resulted in a certain degree of military and administrative paralysis. Examples of this can be seen to varying extents in the Crimean War of 1853-1855, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, World War I, the Soviet-Polish War of 1919-1921, the wars with Finland in the 20th century (1918-1920 and 1939-1940), the war in Afghanistan, and the First Chechen War.

The beginning of several wars was marked by a significant surge of patriotic enthusiasm, which faded in the face of setbacks and rising unforeseen costs. However, this initial enthusiasm had little to do with perceiving the conflict as existential; rather, it reflected the expectation of a swift and decisive victory that would reaffirm Russia's exceptional international status and power. Consequently, the collapse of these expectations and the sharp increase in the war's costs led to demobilisation among the public, the state apparatus, and even the military. This effect was evident to some degree in the early stages of the current war, especially during the Prigozhin episode, which highlighted fissures within the military and governmental systems. Although the Russian military apparatus today appears more unified and consolidated, the limited nature of its successes carries the risk of progressive demobilisation within Clausewitz's 'trinity'. Connable also arrives at a similar conclusion, arguing that a lack of tangible battlefield victories and rising internal costs of the war (primarily economic) could lead Russian society to lose the will to achieve victory and become willing to accept defeat.

It is noteworthy that over the course of three years of war, Russian authorities have experimented with three different models of military conflict. The war began as a 'special military operation' with expectations of a 'swift, low-cost victory' (a 'small victorious war'), reminiscent of recent successes in Georgia and the annexation of Crimea. However, during the setbacks faced by the Russian army in the latter half of 2022 and early 2023, the Kremlin attempted to launch an ideological mobilisation campaign based on the mythology of the Great Patriotic War and rhetoric of sacrificial heroism ('We’ll go to heaven, and they’ll just die'). During this phase, figures like Prigozhin and his Wagner Group, along with a network of military correspondents rose to media and political prominence (→ Re:Russia: The Armed Golem: Mutiny that Putin has started).

Subsequently, the Kremlin was forced to abandon the concept of a 'mobilised nation' and shifted to promoting a model of 'colonial' (commercial) warfare. In this model, war is portrayed as a dangerous but honourable 'job' offering very high material rewards and social status in exchange for significant risks. Sociological and ethnographic studies indicate that forms of military volunteerism that emerged in the early stages of the war quickly lost momentum (→ Re:Russia: Parallel Cheremushkin). The 'mobilisation' discourse remains more marginal or situational within a broader strategy of demobilising propaganda (→ Re:Russia: Intensive Normalisation). Reminders of the existential nature of the confrontation with the West are somewhat abstract and coexist with an understanding that the loyalty of Russian society to the war largely hinges on its relatively low costs and the absence of widespread conscription.

Endless war and its prospects

Society’s response to a given war is closely tied to the type of military conflict. Out of roughly 40 military conflicts Russia has experienced since the early 19th century, only in four instances could one speak of actual 'attacks on Russia' – foreign invasions that provoked a perception of the conflict as existential (see the table below). In the overwhelming majority of cases, these conflicts were either struggles for frontier territories and imperial peripheries or efforts to suppress uprisings in various provinces of the empire.

The majority of Russia's wars have historically been concentrated on five primary 'colonial' frontiers: the Caucasus, the Black Sea region, Poland, the Baltic region, and Central (Middle) Asia. Seven military conflicts have been linked to struggles for control over the Caucasus: three wars with Persia, the major Caucasian War of the 19th century (1817-1864), two Chechen Wars, and the 2008 war with Georgia. Four additional conflicts with Turkey revolved around control over the Black Sea region, influence in the Balkans, and access to the sea itself. Another four conflicts involved struggles over Poland (two Polish uprisings, the 1919-1921 war, and the 1939 occupation), with one of these resulting in defeat for Russia. Similarly, there were four conflicts over the Baltic region and Finland (the Swedish War of 1808-1809, the Red Army's involvement in Finland from 1919 to 1921, the 1939 occupation, and the Winter War of 1939-1940). Four more conflicts were connected to the conquest of Central Asia, and another four involved the Far Eastern frontier. Altogether, these conflicts constitute 60% of all the wars Russia has engaged in over the past 225 years. During this same period, Russia fought against European powers only 10 times (four of which were the Napoleonic Wars). (It is worth noting that Russia's struggle for Poland is typically interpreted both in Russia and in the West within the broader context of Russia’s confrontation with Europe.)

If we look back at Russian wars of the 18th century, we would need to add two more Persian and one additional Caucasian war, five Polish wars, four Russo-Turkish wars, three Russo-Swedish wars for control of the Baltic region and Finland, and one more unsuccessful Khiva campaign (Central Asia). The 17th century adds three Polish wars, two Turkish wars, two Swedish wars, one Caucasian campaign (Buturlin's expedition), and one Persian conflict. Overall, in 425 years of Russian history, there have been 12 wars in the Caucasus, 12 conflicts over Poland, 10 wars with Turkey, nine wars for the Baltic, five for control over Central Asia, and four involving the Far East. Together, these account for 52 colonial frontier conflicts, representing around 70% of the wars Russia has fought during this period.

The fact that a substantial portion of Russia's wars have occurred in a few frontier zones where the country has competed with neighbouring powers is not unusual. However, it is noteworthy that over more than four centuries, Russia has been unable to establish lasting control over these areas. In the 20th century alone, Russia lost most of these territories twice. Following the first collapse from 1917 to 1921, the Red Army managed to reclaim some of them, except for the westernmost territories – Poland, the Baltic states, and Finland – where it suffered defeats.

In the 33 years of post-Soviet history, Russia has already participated in six wars (five of them under Putin's rule). This means that Russia has engaged in warfare at roughly the same rate as over the previous four centuries – about one war every 5.5 years. With the exception of the distant Syrian expedition, these conflicts – three in the Caucasus and two in Ukraine – have been returned to traditional conflict zones along Russia’s colonial frontier. Notably, the two wars in Ukraine have led to the occupation of the Black Sea region, with a land corridor to Crimea serving as a continuation and extension of the peninsula's annexation. This model resembles the Russo-Turkish wars of the 17th and 19th centuries. Meanwhile, in Russia’s geopolitical vision, Ukraine, as a Slavic country that Moscow claims the West aims to turn into an anti-Russian outpost, has come to occupy the functional role that Poland once did. As a result, three traditional axes of Russia’s struggle for 'survival/expansion' have been reactivated.

From this very brief overview, several conclusions can be drawn about how the current Russia-Ukraine conflict looks in the context of the history of Russian wars:

• The Russia-Ukraine conflict is not perceived as an existential struggle threatening Russia's very existence (unlike the two 'Patriotic' Wars). This reduces Russia’s 'will to win' compared to conflicts felt as direct existential threats;

• The conflict resembles a frontier war on one of Russia’s traditional fronts. However, it is also interpreted – at least by part of Russian society and elites – as a proxy confrontation with the West. Russia has both won (e.g., suppressing Polish uprisings in the 19th century) and lost such wars (e.g., the Crimean War, the 1919-1921 Polish War, and 20th-century wars with Finland). The Western support for Ukraine significantly increases the likelihood of Russian defeat;

• In the historical context of Russian frontier wars, ending the conflict through negotiations and compromise is unlikely to be a true conclusion. Instead, it is more likely to serve as a temporary pause, with the potential for future attempts at revenge or efforts to solidify dominance;

• The likelihood of escalating tensions in the Baltic region is very high, as it represents the fourth most popular direction for Russia’s frontier conflicts, and it has not yet been engaged in the post-Soviet period;

• The Russia-Ukraine conflict shares traits of wars Russia has lost: notably, misjudging its own strength and underestimating the opponent’s will to resist. This miscalculation leads to societal disillusionment with Russia's military and state potential, demobilisation, and a weakening of the 'will to win' (e.g., the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921, the war in Afghanistan, and the First Chechen War);

• In terms of duration and intensity, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is already among the top ten or twelve largest wars in Russian history. This increases the 'cost of defeat' for Russia’s state apparatus and society, thereby heightening their 'will to fight', though societal costs have not yet reached critical levels;

• Western military and economic aid somewhat mitigates the 'resource imbalance' between Russia and Ukraine, implying that the outcome will be more dependent on the 'competition of wills' among Russia, Ukraine, and the West. An essential component of this competition is each side's perception of the other two parties’ ‘will to fight’.

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Military conflicts of Russia from the beginning of the 19th century to the present (defeats are highlighted in red)

1 Napoleonic Wars War of the Third Coalition 1805 European conflict

2 Napoleonic Wars War of the Fourth Coalition 1806–1807 European conflict

3 Napoleonic Wars French invasion of Russia 1812 European conflict

4 Napoleonic Wars War of the Sixth Coalition 1813–1814 European conflict

5 Russo-Persian Wars First Russo-Persian War 1804–1813 Caucasian wars

6 Russo-Persian Wars Second Russo-Persian War 1826–1828 Caucasian wars

7 Caucasian War 1817–1864 Caucasian wars

8 Russo-Turkish wars 1806–1812 Struggle with Turkey for control of the Black Sea coastline

9 Russo-Turkish wars 1828–1829 Struggle with Turkey for control of the Black Sea coastline

10 Anglo-Russian War 1807–1812 European conflict

11 Finnish War accession of Finland 1808–1809 Fighting for the Baltic and Finland

12 November Uprising 1830–1831 Fighting for Poland

13 Khivan campaign of 1839 1839–1840 Conquest of Central Asia

14 Austrian assistance in suppressing the Hungarian Uprising 1848–1849 European conflict

15 Kokand war 1850–1868 Conquest of Central Asia

16 Crimean War 1853–1855 European conflict

17 January Uprising 1863–1864 Fighting for Poland

18 Bukhara campaigns 1866–1868 Conquest of Central Asia

19 Russian conquest of Central Asia completion of the conquest of Central Asia 1870–1876 Conquest of Central Asia

20 Russo-Turkish War 1877–1878 Struggle with Turkey for control of the Black Sea coastline

21 Panjdeh incident confrontation with Britain 1885 Fighting for Afghanistan

22 Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905 Far Eastern wars

23 Russian involvement in the Persian Constitutional Revolution 1909–1911 Caucasian wars

24 World War I 1914–1918 European conflict

25 Civil War including interventions by the German army and Entente countries 1918–1923 European conflict

26 Soviet-Finnish armed conflict 1918–1920 Fighting for the Baltic and Finland

27 Polish–Soviet War 1919–1921 Fighting for Poland

28 Red Army intervention in Afghanistan Fighting for Central Asia 1929–1930 Conquest of Central Asia

29 Soviet–Japanese border conflicts 1929, 1934, 1938–1939 Far Eastern wars

30 Occupation of Polish territories 1939 Fighting for Poland

31 Winter War 1939–1940 Fighting for the Baltic and Finland

32 World War II 1941–1945 European conflict

33 Soviet-Japanese War 1945 Far Eastern wars

34 Hungarian uprising 1956 Struggle for zones of influence in Europe

35 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968 Struggle for zones of influence in Europe

36 Soviet–Afghan War 1979–1989 Fighting for Afghanistan

37 First Chechen War 1994–1996 Caucasian wars

38 Second Chechen War 1999–2009 Caucasian wars

39 Russo-Georgian War 2008 Caucasian wars

40 Annexation of Crimea and the proxy war in eastern Ukraine 2014–2015 Fighting for Ukraine

41 Syrian civil war 2015– ... Struggle for zones of influence...

42 Russian invasion of Ukraine 2022– ... Fighting for Ukraine...

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